An in-depth look at Afghan guerrilla tactics
After a 10-year manhunt, the mastermind of one of the deadliest attacks in U.S. History, Osama bin Laden, has been eliminated. While this may be a significant victory for America, the war on terror is far from over.
But this war is no stranger to history. Over 20 years have passed since the Soviet-Afghan War, yet American war fighters are still suffering from the same strategic faults of the Soviets. With history staring us in the face, we must ensure we don’t make the same mistakes as those who came before us.
This book was designed as the companion to Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. The after action reports contained in The Other Side of the Mountain focus on the Mujahideen tactics that made these commanders, mostly made up of civilians, such a force to be reckoned with.
The tools you need to fight an insurgency
Most of the tactical reviews included are coupled with a color full-page map complete with topography, movements of forces, fields of fire and more. Each event describes in detail what caused the mission to succeed or fail, and what should have been done differently.
"This book provides a detailed look into how our enemy fights and thinks. Little has changed since the Soviets fought the Mujahideen. Learn from their mistakes. A must read for anyone deploying to Afghanistan. Reading this book could save your life or the lives of your team members."
—CSM (Ret) Mark Gerecht, U.S. Army
Author: Lester W. Grau
ISBN-10: 0984074937
ISBN-13: 9780984074938
Excerpt from The Other Side of the Mountain:
As we were leisurely enjoying our breakfast, some people came into the house and said that the convoy was coming from the north. This was at about 1000 hours. While we were running to our positions, the lead tank in the column came to our road block. The tank driver stopped his tank, got out of the tank and moved the barrier. He had gotten back into his tank and driven past as we reached our positions. Mulla Latif was breathing heavily as he picked up his RPG-7 and fired at the next tank. His first shot missed. He reloaded, fired again and missed again. He was still breathing too heavily to aim accurately. He then reloaded, jumped out of position, and ran down to the road. He then sat down in the middle of road and fired at the tank from close range. He hit the tank this time and it burst into flames. The column was just coming out of the narrow Tangi Waghjan Gorge. This burning tank stopped the convoy since there was no room to maneuver or pass. Other Mujahideen from other areas and groups ran to the area and moved up the gorge by the trapped column and started firing at the vehicles. There was not much resistance from this supply convoy. The column consisted of 150 to 200 trucks full of many things such as food and furniture. Whatever we could take away, we did. Hundreds of Mujahideen came and looted the column. We captured 15 trucks for my group which we eventually moved to our base in Durow canyon. We torched the vehicles we could not take and left the area around 1300 hours.. After we had finished, helicopters and aircraft came and bombed some areas around the ambush site. Despite our lack of warning when the lead vehicle came toward our ambush site, the ambush turned out well.
There is a reason why we were not in our positions when the column came. Prior to any ambush, we would select and prepare our ambush positions, but we would not occupy them since helicopters would always overfly the route ahead of the convoy looking for ambushes and roadblocks. Normally, we would not put out the road block until after the flyover, but for some reason this time we did. The helicopter flyover was our usual tipoff that the convoy was coming, and our signal to put out the roadblock and occupy our positions. The helicopters did not do their road sweep in front of this particular convoy. I later learned why the helicopters were absent. DRA President Barbak Karmal was flying to Moscow that day and so the DRA had imposed a “no fly zone” over Kabul. This meant that helicopters were either grounded or had to refuel at Ghazni. The helicopters were not available to do the sweep.
